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Note
Arresting DNA: Privacy Expectations of Free
Citizens Versus Post-Convicted Persons and the
Unconstitutionality of DNA Dragnets
Aaron B. Chapin*
On November 8, 1999, Charles Raines, then incarcerated
in a Maryland penitentiary, had his inner cheek swabbed by
the State to collect his DNA for inclusion in a statewide DNA
database.1 As it turned out, Raines's DNA matched that col-
lected from a rape victim in an unsolved 1996 case. 2 In August
2003, Raines was indicted for the 1996 rape.3 Raines's attempt
to suppress the DNA evidence, as an unreasonable search per-
formed without suspicion in violation of the Fourth Amend-
ment, was denied by the Maryland Appellate Court in a 4-3 de-
cision.4
On March 25, 2002, Thomas Kincade was asked by his pa-
role officer to submit a blood sample to obtain his DNA for in-
clusion in the combined DNA database. 5 Kincade refused for
personal reasons and was held in violation of the DNA Analysis
Backlog Elimination Act of 2000 (DNA Act).6 As a result, his
stay of sentence was lifted and he was taken into custody
* J.D. Candidate 2006, University of Minnesota Law School; B.A. 2002,
Drake University, Des Moines, Iowa. The author would like to thank Professor
Barry Feld, Daniel Moore, and Ryan Stai for their helpful comments and sug-
gestions.
1. Maryland v. Raines, 857 A.2d 19, 21-23 (Md. 2004).
2. Id. at 22.
3. Id. at 20.
4. Id.
5. United States v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813, 820 (9th Cir. 2004).
6. The DNA Analysis Backlog Elimination Act of 2000 provides funds to
states for processing stored DNA samples, and authorizes the samples to be
taken from federal and military offenders. See 42 U.S.C. § 14135 (2000). Since
2000, every state has passed DNA acts of their own allowing for DNA of post-
convicted persons to be entered into a combined database. Laurie Stroum Ye-
shulas, DNA Dragnet Practices: Are They Constitutional?, 8 SUFFOLK J. TRIAL
& APP. ADvoc. 133, 135 n.18 (2003) (listing the laws of all fifty states author-
izing the use of these criminal DNA databases).
1842
ARRESTING DNA
where he was forced to submit a DNA sample.7 Kincade chal-
lenged the DNA Act as an unconstitutional violation of his
Fourth Amendment rights, but that challenge was rejected by
the Ninth Circuit in a 5-1-5 decision.8
In 2001 and 2002, Baton Rouge, Louisiana police con-
ducted a DNA dragnet in an attempt to solve a serial murder
case. 9 Without having a warrant, probable cause, or even rea-
sonable suspicion, police asked over 600 men for a sample of
their DNA.10 One person caught up in this dragnet, Floyd Wag-
ster, Jr., complied with the police request, but only after being
coerced. 1' As a result, Wagster filed suit against the depart-
ment, protesting the coercive practice of DNA dragnets. 12 How-
ever, Wagster's attempt to have his sample returned or de-
stroyed, as well as other attacks on the constitutionality of
allowing police to retain these samples, has thus far been un-
successful. 13
This Note examines the Fourth Amendment questions of
whether, and under what circumstances, police may obtain a
DNA sample, retain that sample, and use that sample to create
a DNA fingerprint for later use. Applying the reasoning used in
DNA Act cases to the issue of DNA dragnets, this Note argues
that compelled DNA collection from free citizens without indi-
vidualized suspicion is necessarily unconstitutional. Further
analysis demonstrates the inapplicability of various Fourth
Amendment exceptions to these dragnets and raises serious
questions regarding the viability of consent to DNA searches.
Part I of this Note examines the practice of DNA dragnets
and how they work. Part II reviews the reasonableness test be-
hind the Fourth Amendment, and the relevant exceptions to
the constitutional doctrine. Part III examines the privacy ex-
pectations of post-convicted persons and introduces litigation
regarding the DNA Act. Finally, Part IV applies the reasoning
behind DNA Act cases to DNA dragnets, and, after examining
7. Kincade, 379 F.3d at 821.
8. Id.
9. Richard Willing, La. Case Triggers Battle over DNA, USA TODAY, May
29, 2003, at 3A.
10. Id.
11. DNA Suit Issues Will Not Go Away, THE BATON ROUGE ADVOC., Aug.
19, 2004, at 8B [hereinafter DNA Suit Issues].
12. Id.
13. See id.; Willing, supra note 9.
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other possible avenues for the legality of these dragnets, ulti-
mately concludes that the practice is unconstitutional.
I. THE HISTORY AND PROCEDURE OF DNA DRAGNETS
In December 1996, Juli Busken, a twenty-one-year-old
University of Oklahoma dance student, was brutally raped and
murdered. 14 The police had no leads, except for some DNA evi-
dence collected from the rape itself.15 Twenty years earlier, this
case would have probably been filed away as unsolvable. In-
deed, even in 1996, there was little the police could do. Today,
however, the police have a suspect-a DNA profile extracted
from the semen found at the scene. To find out who the profile
matched, police "searched" the DNA of hundreds of men with
only vague connections to the victim, in what the media dubbed
a "DNA dragnet."'16
The first reported DNA dragnet took place in Britain in
1986, where police sought voluntary blood samples from over
4500 men connected to a village where two teenage girls were
raped and murdered. 17 The DNA itself did not provide a sus-
pect, but when Colin Pitchfork did not show up to have his
DNA collected, the police had their man.' 8 These DNA dragnets
are less common in the United States than the rest of the
world 19 because of concerns raised by the Fourth Amendment. 20
14. -60 Minutes (CBS television broadcast, Sept. 12, 2004).
15. Id.
16. Id. The dragnet was ultimately unsuccessful; police found a suspect
already incarcerated in the Oklahoma state penitentiary. Id.
17. See Jeffrey S. Grand, The Blooding of America: Privacy and the DNA
Dragnet, 23 CARDOZO L. REv. 2277, 2285 (2002); see also Mark Hansen, DNA
Dragnet, A.B.A. J., May 2004, at 38, 38; Richard Willing, Privacy Issue Is the
Catch in Police DNA "Dragnets," USA TODAY, Sept. 16, 1998, at 1A.
18. See Grand, supra note 17, at 2285; 60 Minutes, supra note 14.
19. See 60 Minutes, supra note 14; see also Fred Barbash, Crime-Solving
by DNA Dragnet: Britain Makes Arrests in Rape Cases After Thousands of
"Voluntary" Neighborhood Tests, WASH. POST, Feb. 2, 1996, at A21 (referenc-
ing three foreign DNA dragnets before 1996); Hansen, supra note 17, at 42
(noting that, in Europe, "DNA testing has become almost routine"); Willing,
supra note 17, at 1A (noting that DNA dragnets are an accepted practice in
many European countries). The largest DNA dragnet took place in Germany
in 1998, where over 16,000 people were searched. David M. Halbfinger, Ex-
perts Question Growing Practice of DNA Dragnets: Coercive Test May Violate
Rights, HOUSTON CHRON., Jan. 4, 2003, at 23; Hansen, supra note 17, at 42.
20. See Willing, supra note 17, at 2A (quoting Simon Davies, a visiting fel-
low at the London School of Economics: 'The received wisdom has always been
that the U.S. was immune (to widespread DNA searches) because of your Con-
stitution.").
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Possibly the first such dragnet to take place in the United
States happened in San Diego in 1990, where police tested
about 800 men in search of a serial killer.21 However, despite
Fourth Amendment concerns, DNA dragnets are becoming in-
creasingly common in this country with over eighteen occurring
since 1990, four of which happened in 2004.22
The procedure of DNA dragnets is fairly straightforward. If
the police recover DNA evidence from a crime scene, but have
no suspect, police take DNA samples from dozens to hundreds
of persons who are not suspects, but who live or work near the
crime scene.23 These samples are used to create a "genetic fin-
gerprint" of the individual searched, which is compared to the
evidence from the scene in hopes of finding a genetic match.
24
21. See Hansen, supra note 17, at 42.
22. Between 1994 and 1995 only two DNA dragnets took place--one in
suburban Miami, Florida and another in Ann Arbor, Michigan. See Dana Haw-
kins, Keeping Secrets: As DNA Banks Multiply, Who Is Guarding the Safe?,
U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Dec. 2, 2002, at 58, 58; Penny Brown Roberts, La.
Suit May Set DNA Law: Serial Killer 'Dragnetting' Raises Nationwide Issue,
BATON ROUGE ADVOC., Sept. 21, 2003, at 1A. Since January 2004 there have
been separate dragnets in Omaha, Nebraska; Wichita, Kansas; Oklahoma
City, Oklahoma; and Truro, Massachusetts. Jonathan Finer, Baffled Police
Try DNA Sweep; Town's Men Asked To Give Samples in Murder Case, WASH.
POST, Jan. 12, 2005, at A3 (describing the DNA dragnet in Truro, Massachu-
setts); More Details of BTK Case Matter to Public, WICHITA EAGLE, Jan. 23,
2005, at 14A (describing the Wichita, Kansas DNA dragnet and noting that it
is now the largest in the nation's history with over 4000 individuals searched);
60 Minutes, supra note 14 (describing the DNA dragnet in Oklahoma City,
Oklahoma); Swab? DNA Dragnets Raise Troubling Issues, WICHITA EAGLE,
Sept. 15, 2004, at 6A [hereinafter DNA Dragnets] (describing the Wichita DNA
dragnet); Willing, supra note 9, at 3A (mentioning the DNA dragnet in Okla-
homa City); Kristin Zagurski, DNA Requests Warranted Omaha's Police Chief
Defends Using a List of Black OPPD Workers as an "Efficient Way" to Pursue a
Lead in a Rape Investigation, OMAHA WORLD-HERALD, June 30, 2004, at 2B
(describing the DNA dragnet in Omaha). In total there have been at least
eighteen such DNA dragnets in the United States since 1990. DNA Dragnets,
supra, at 6A; Finer, supra, at 3A.
23. Willing, supra note 17, at 1A (defining DNA dragnet in Cheverly,
Maryland as "taking DNA samples from dozens of men who are not suspects
but who live or work near the scene of a crime"); see also Hansen, supra note
17, at 40 (defining DNA dragnet as a process "in which police collect samples
on a large scale from individuals who are not suspects, but merely live or work
near the crime scene. These samples are used to create DNA profiles that are
compared to the profile of the perpetrator.").
24. To create the "genetic fingerprint" used by police and DNA databases,
forensic scientists identify specific 'loci" (or genetic markers) on the sample
gene. COMM. ON DNA FORENSIC SCI., NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE
EVALUATION OF FORENSIC DNA EVIDENCE 63, 66 (1996) [hereinafter DNA
EVIDENCE]. These loci are located in areas of the genome which scientists cur-
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However, since dragnetees are not suspects, police do not have
authority to compel a search. 25 Therefore, dragnets are con-
ducted on a supposedly voluntary basis;26 but since refusing to
consent raises suspicions, 27 there is little an individual can do
to avoid having their DNA sampled. 28 The DNA dragnet's
greatest usefulness is in stirring up potential suspects.
Once the investigation ends or eliminates the dragnetee as
a suspect, the question remains of what to do with the genetic
fingerprints on file. The federal DNA Act and most state DNA
collection statutes direct the state to expunge from the DNA
databank the profiles of convicted persons whose convictions
were reversed. 29 However, these statues do not address the pro-
files taken from persons who are not even suspects.30 As a re-
sult, profiles are often retained in private police "suspect data-
bases" which, while not shared among the states, are
nevertheless routinely searched by the individual depart-
ments. 3 1
rently believe have no genetic function, and were "purposely selected because
they are not associated with any known physical or medical characteristics."
H.R. Rep. No. 106-900(I), at 27 (2000); see also DNA EVIDENCE, supra, at 65.
25. See generally Grand, supra note 17, at 2294-2303 (arguing separately
that detention of the person to obtain the sample is an illegal seizure and col-
lecting the sample is an illegal search of the person). This Note recognizes the
distinction between search and seizure, but focuses on the sample as a search
as opposed to the investigatory stop as a seizure.
26. See Willing, supra note 9, at 3A (noting that police prefer to call DNA
dragnets "voluntary elimination screens"); Willing, supra note 17, at 2A (re-
porting that police say the dragnets do "not violate the Fourth Amendment's
bar on warrantless searches because samples are given voluntarily").
27. See Willing, supra note 9, at 3A ("Police concede that those guilty of
crimes seldom volunteer to give their DNA sample. Even so, police say that
also can be helpful. It raises suspicions about those who refuse and allows po-
lice to investigate them as potential suspects.").
28. See, e.g., id. (describing Shannon Kohler's uncooperative experience in
the Louisiana dragnet).
29. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 14132 (2000), amended by Justice For All Act of
2004, Pub. L. No. 108-405, 118 Stat. 2260 (mandating the destruction of DNA
collected from arrestees whose arrest does not result in a conviction); CONN.
GEN. STAT. § 54-1021 (2003) (same); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:614 (West 2004)
(same).
30. See, e.g., Roberts, supra note 22, at 14S ("[T]here are no regulations in
Louisiana or other states to prevent [DNA profiles collected in dragnets] from
being stored elsewhere and compared to evidence from any past or future
crime anywhere.")
31. See id. at 1A (noting that London, Ohio police have private profiles
from more than 1020 innocent people, and cities like Chicago and Miami have
constructed "suspect databases"); Willing, supra note 9, at 3A (noting that po-
lice departments argue that they have a right to keep these samples); see also
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II. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT'S REASONABLENESS
TEST AND ITS RELEVANT EXCEPTIONS
In colonial America, suspicionless searches were not un-
common. 32 A petty officer of the king, armed only with a gen-
eral warrant, could break down a man's door, search for taxable
goods, and seize whatever he considered to be "uncustomed
goods."33 Such searches were understandably bothersome to the
early American colonists who retained the idea of a man's home
as his castle.34 The Fourth Amendment was designed to protect
the home from these intrusions 35 by enumerating "[tihe right of
the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and ef-
fects, against unreasonable searches and seizures."
3 6
While the text of the Fourth Amendment specifically bars
"unreasonable" government searches, it fails to specify the
Hansen, supra note 17, at 43 (stating that before conducting a dragnet, inves-
tigators can look at the DNA information already on file); Hawkins, supra note
22, at 59 (noting that profiles collected from persons caught up in the dragnet
are not excluded from the suspects' databases and officials run searches in-
cluding these nonsuspects' samples).
32. William Cuddihy & B. Carmon Hardy, A Man's House Was Not His
Castle: Origins of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, 37
WM. & MARY Q. 371, 371-72 (1980).
33. See EDWARD C. FISHER, SEARCH AND SEIZURE 3 (1970) (explaining the
concept of a general warrant); David E. Steinberg, High School Drug Testing
and the Original Understanding of the Fourth Amendment, 30 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 263, 270-88 (2003) (explaining the historical understanding of the
Fourth Amendment). See generally Tracey Maclin, The Complexity of the
Fourth Amendment: A Historical Review, 77 B.U. L. REV. 925, 939-50 (1997)
(explaining general warrants and the historical factors that shaped the coun-
try's shift to a specific warrant preference).
34. See, e.g., JACOB W. LANDYNSKI, SEARCH AND SEIZURE AND THE
SUPREME COURT 34 (1966) (quoting James Otis, Jr.: "[The Writ of Assistance]
is against the fundamental principles of law, the privilege of house. A man
who is quiet is as secure in his house as a prince in his castle .. "); Cuddihy
& Hardy, supra note 32, at 391-92 (describing some colonists' violent reaction
to searches they felt were unreasonable).
35. See Andrew E. Taslitz, Respect and the Fourth Amendment, 94 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 15, 16 (2003). The motivation behind the Amend-
ment is only explainable by understanding the history of governmental
abuses. See Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 301 (1967) (stating that the
Fourth Amendment "was a reaction to the evils of the use of the general war-
rant in England and the writs of assistance in the Colonies"); see also Boyd v.
United States, 116 U.S. 616, 625 (1886) (recognizing that writs of assistance,
and the anger they caused, were "fresh in the memories of those
who ... established our form of government"); FISHER, supra note 33, at 8;
LANDYNSKI, supra note 34, at 19-20.
36. U.S CONST. amend. IV. For a thorough examination of the historical
practices, abuses, and precedents that shaped the Fourth Amendment, see
generally, Cuddihy & Hardy, supra note 32.
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meaning of "reasonable." 7 In most circumstances, courts have
interpreted the reasonableness of any search to hinge upon the
government's fulfillment of the Warrant Clause. 38 However,
even without a warrant, a search may be permissible in certain
circumstances. 39 In determining the reasonableness of a war-
rantless search, the court must balance "the degree to which
[the search] intrudes upon an individual's privacy [with] the
degree to which it is needed for the promotion of legitimate
governmental interests."40 While this reasonableness balancing
test remains the traditional constitutional standard, there exist
"a few specifically established and well-delineated excep-
tions,"41 such as governmental "special needs," the Terry stop,
and voluntary consent. 42
A. THE "SPECIAL NEEDS" EXCEPTION
The "special needs" doctrine encompasses cases involving
"searches conducted for important non-law enforcement pur-
poses in contexts where adherence to the warrant-and-probable
cause requirement would be impracticable." 43 The doctrine is
37. U.S. CONST. amend. IV; see also Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S.
106, 108-09 (1977) (describing reasonableness as the "touchstone" of Fourth
Amendment analysis); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 (1968) (describing "rea-
sonableness in all the circumstances of the particular governmental invasion
of a citizen's personal security" as the "central inquiry" under the Fourth
Amendment); LANDYNSKI, supra note 34, at 45-46.
38. "[A]nd no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by
Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and
the persons or things to be seized." U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The importance of
obtaining a warrant has shifted through the years. WILLIAM W. GREENHALGH,
THE FOURTH AMENDMENT HANDBOOK: A CHRONOLOGICAL SURVEY OF
SUPREME COURT DECISIONS 8 (1995).
39. FISHER, supra note 33, at 65.
40. Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 300 (1999); see also Camara v.
Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523, 536-37 (1967) ("[T]here can be no ready test for de-
termining reasonableness other than by balancing the need to search against
the invasion which the search entails."). There is no "fixed formula" for deter-
mining the reasonableness of searches. See United States v. Rabinowitz, 339
U.S. 56, 70 (1950) (suggesting that courts must consider the context of a
search to measure the reasonableness of the search); Ker v. California, 374
U.S. 23, 33 (1963) (characterizing the task of laying down a fixed formula for
determining reasonableness of searches as "impossible").
41. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967).
42. This list is not exclusive, but instead merely representative of those
exceptions that may be relevant to the present issue. For a more complete list
of these exceptions, see generally FISHER, supra note 33, at 65.
43. United States v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813, 823 (9th Cir. 2004) (emphasis
added).
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usually applied to searches in schools and regulated industries,
where the main objective of the search is something other than
crime detection.44 The "special needs" doctrine has been used to
uphold information-gathering highway checkpoints 45 and non-
intrusive searches of public employees to investigate potential
misconduct, 46 as well as random drug tests of public school stu-
dents participating in extracurricular activities, 47 U.S. customs
officials, 48 and railroad employees. 49
In cases where police impose a regulatory scheme to detect
general criminal wrongdoing, the Supreme Court has ruled the
"special needs" doctrine inapplicable. For example, in City of
Indianapolis v. Edmond,50 the Court refused to apply the "spe-
cial needs" doctrine to a highway checkpoint system where po-
lice randomly stopped cars to determine if the driver was con-
ducting any illegal activity, because the primary purpose of the
checkpoint was the general investigation of crime.51 Also, in
Ferguson v. City of Charleston,52 the Court struck down a pro-
gram where hospitals shared with police the medical informa-
tion of patients who tested positive for narcotics because the
program's objective was to generate evidence for criminal in-
vestigations.5 3
B. THE TERRY STOP-AND-FRISK EXCEPTION AND
FINGERPRINTING DRAGNETS
A police officer is justified in briefly stopping and frisking
an individual without probable cause if that officer reasonably
believes the individual, whose suspicious activity the officer has
observed at close range, is armed and poses a threat of harm to
44. See Grand, supra note 17, at 2300; see also, e.g., New Jersey v. T.L.O.,
469 U.S. 325, 339 (1985) ("[P]reservation of order and a proper educational en-
vironment requires close supervision of schoolchildren, as well as the enforce-
ment of rules against conduct that would be perfectly permissible if under-
taken by an adult.").
45. Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419, 428 (2004).
46. O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 725-26 (1987).
47. Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 838 (2002); Vernonia Sch. Dist.
47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 665-66 (1995).
48. Nat'l Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 676-77
(1989).
49. Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 633-34 (1989).
50. 531 U.S. 32 (2000).
51. Id. at 42.
52. 532 U.S. 67 (2001).
53. See id. at 83.
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the officer or others in the area. 54 However, "[e]ven a limited
search of the outer clothing for weapons constitutes a severe,
though brief, intrusion upon cherished personal security"5 5 and
therefore must be limited to the scope and purpose of immedi-
ate public safety. 56 Nevertheless, the Terry stop has expanded
to include investigatory stops as long as the officer's initial sus-
picion is reasonable and his actions do not exceed that neces-
sary to investigate that suspicion.57
In the context of fingerprinting dragnets, Davis v. Missis-
sippi58 held that detentions without probable cause, for the
purpose of collecting fingerprints, violate the Fourth Amend-
ment. 59 Davis involved police taking dozens of African Ameri-
can youths into custody without warrants or probable cause,
based solely on a victim's vague description.60 The youths were
taken to police headquarters, fingerprinted, briefly interro-
gated, and then released without charge. 61 The Court applied
the Fourth Amendment to these "investigatory" seizures be-
cause failure to do so would "subject unlimited numbers of in-
54. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 24 (1968).
55. Id at 24-25.
56. See id. at 26 ("Thus [the stop-and-frisk search] must be limited to that
which is necessary for the discovery of weapons which might be used to harm
the officer or others nearby, and may realistically be characterized as some-
thing less than a 'full' search, even though it remains a serious intrusion.").
Because the government's purpose in the frisk is limited to safety of the officer
or the immediate public, the frisk is severely limited in scope and the officer
must have an articulable suspicion that the person is armed. GREENHALGH,
supra note 38, at 12.
57. See United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 682 (1985) (citing Terry,
392 U.S. at 20); see also Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court, 124 S. Ct. 2451,
2458 (2004) (upholding a statutory requirement that an individual identify
himself when asked by the police as a reasonable Terry stop); Florida v. Rodri-
guez, 469 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1984); Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 146 (1972) ("A
brief stop of a suspicious individual, in order to determine his identity or to
maintain the status quo momentarily while obtaining more information, may
be most reasonable in light of the facts known to the officer at the time."). But
see Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500 (1983) (noting that investigative stops
must be temporary and employ the least intrusive search means reasonably
available); Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 93-94 (1979) ("Nothing in Terry can
be understood to allow ... any search whatever for anything but weapons."); 3
WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT 539 (2d ed. 1987) ("[T]here is no search-for-evidence counterpart
to the Terry weapons search, permissible on only a reasonable suspicion that
such evidence would be found.").
58. 394 U.S. 721 (1969).
59. Id. at 728.




nocent persons to the harassment and ignominy [of] involun-
tary detention"62-an intrusion the Fourth Amendment was
clearly designed to prohibit. 63 Sixteen years later, Hayes v.
Florida64 followed the Davis Court's reasoning, holding the con-
stitutional line to be crossed "when the police, without probable
cause or a warrant, forcibly remove a person from his home or
other place in which he is entitled to be and transport him to
the police station, where he is detained, although briefly, for
investigative purposes." 65
Despite the Davis Court's application of the Fourth
Amendment, the Hayes Court did not exclude the possibility
that narrowly circumscribed procedures could permit the con-
stitutional acquisition of fingerprints without probable cause.
6 6
Expanding on this dictum, the Hayes Court suggested that un-
der some circumstances the Fourth Amendment would allow
in-field searches 67 to obtain fingerprints with only reasonable
cause. 68 Accordingly, prolonged detention for the purpose of ob-
taining fingerprints resembles arrest and is unconstitutional
without probable cause, while brief detention for that limited
purpose may be permissible with only reasonable suspicion
that the individual has committed a crime.
69
C. THE STANDARD FOR CONSENT TO SEARCHES
Absent a search warrant, probable cause, or one of the ex-
ceptions mentioned above, police can still conduct searches
with the individual's consent.70 The key inquiry is whether or
62. Id. at 726.
63. Id. at 726-27 ("Nothing is more clear than that the Fourth Amend-
ment was meant to prevent wholesale intrusions upon the personal security of
our citizenry, whether these intrusions be termed 'arrests' or 'investigatory
detentions."').
64. 470 U.S. 811 (1985).
65. Id. at 816.
66. See Davis, 394 U.S. at 728.
67. In-field searches are those conducted outside the police station when
an individual is not removed from a place where he or she is entitled to be, but
only detained briefly for the purpose of collecting fingerprints. See Hayes, 470
U.S. at 816-17.
68. See id. But see id. at 819 (Brennan, J., concurring) (characterizing the
majority's dicta as a "regrettable assault on the Fourth Amendment").
69. Only a few state courts have affirmatively followed the dicta in Hayes.
See e.g., Harrison v. Florida, 524 So. 2d 1139, 1140 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988);
Washington v. Hoffpauir, 722 P.2d 113, 115-16 (Wash. Ct. App. 1986).
70. See Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 250-51 (1991) ("[Wle have long
approved consensual searches because it is no doubt reasonable for the police
18512005]
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not the consent was truly voluntary.7 1 Since the standard for
all searches is reasonableness, and it is the police officer con-
ducting the search, it is through his eyes that the consent must
seem reasonable. 72 Thus, the inquiry is whether an objective
police officer reasonably believes that the subject's consent is
voluntary. 73
Determining the reasonableness of the police officer's belief
is a factual question, to be answered by examining the sur-
rounding circumstances.7 4 Factors that aid the court in deter-
mining the presence of duress or coercion include: the consent-
ing party's vulnerability, age, education, intelligence, and
knowledge of his right to refuse consent, as well as the physical
environment in which he is consenting. 75 While none of these
factors alone substantiates duress, some weigh more heavily on
that finding than others. 76 For instance, in Bumper v. North
to conduct a search once they have been permitted to do so." (citing Schneck-
loth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973))); see also GREENHALGH, supra
note 38, at 13 ("Some Fourth Amendment commentators preferred to think of
consent as an instance of Fourth Amendment inapplicability rather than as an
instance of Fourth Amendment satisfaction. The theory was that any constitu-
tional right, including a Fourth Amendment protection, may be waived.").
71. See Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 248 (holding that when the "State at-
tempts to justify a search on the basis of... consent, the Fourth and Four-
teenth Amendments require that it demonstrate that the consent was in fact
voluntarily given, and not the result of duress or coercion, express or im-
plied").
72. See GREENHALGH, supra note 38, at 13; see also LAFAVE, supra note
57, at 158-60 (noting that the relevant case law favors the objective "reason-
able belief by the police" view over the "actual consenter's state of mind" view);
cf. Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 185-86 (1990) ("[I]n order to satisfy the
'reasonableness' requirement of the Fourth Amendment, what is generally
demanded of the many factual determinations that must regularly be made by
agents of the government.., is not that they always be correct, but that they
always be reasonable.").
73. Police must recognize instances where their actions intimidate or co-
erce, and such instances, viewed objectively, are unreasonable. See, e.g.,
United States v. Timberlake, 896 F.2d 592, 595-96 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (holding
consent inapplicable because it was tainted by police illegal entry into home);
United States v. Mapp, 476 F.2d 67, 78 (2d Cir. 1973) (holding that no consent
was present when police entered bedroom of suspect with guns drawn and
demanded he surrender property).
74. See LAFAVE, supra note 57, at 158.
75. See Grand, supra note 17, at 2303. See generally LAFAVE, supra note
57, at 174-228 (explaining various factors bearing upon validity of consent).
76. See ROBERT M. BLOOM, SEARCHES, SEIZURES, AND WARRANTS: A
REFERENCE GUIDE TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 115-17 (2003);
LAFAVE, supra note 57, at 175-76.
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Carolina,77 the police officer's misrepresentation that they had
a warrant in hand created a situation "instinct with coercion."
78
To reiterate, for a search to be reasonable, the govern-
ment's need to conduct the search must outweigh the search's
impact on the privacy of the individual. Because the court must
take into account the totality of the circumstances when mak-
ing this determination, the privacy expectations of the person
searched are particularly relevant. 79
III. THE LIMITED PRIVACY EXPECTATIONS OF POST-
CONVICTED PERSONS ARE PARTICULARLY RELEVANT
IN DNA ACT CASES
When applying the Fourth Amendment, courts distinguish
the privacy expectations of post-convicted persons from those of
free citizens. For instance, in Griffin v. Wisconsin,80 the Court
upheld a warrantless search of a probationer's home.81 Al-
though recognizing that a probationer's home, like any other
citizen's home, is protected from unreasonable searches under
the Fourth Amendment, the Court nevertheless ruled that the
Constitution permits searches of parolees and probationers
based on no more than reasonable suspicion.8 2 Utilizing the
"special needs" exception, Justice Scalia explained that the
"State's operation of a probation system, like its operation of a
school, government office or prison, or its supervision of a regu-
lated industry, likewise presents 'special needs' beyond normal
law enforcement that may justify departures from the usual
warrant and probable-cause requirements."8 3
The situation in United States v. Knights8 4 was similar to
that in Griffin with a few exceptions. Like Griffin, Knights was
a probationer whose home was searched without a warrant.
However, unlike Griffin, the warrantless search in Knights was
not pursuant to a general regulatory system and therefore did
not fall under the "special needs" doctrine.8 5 Nevertheless, the
Court utilized the traditional standards balancing test and
77. 391 U.S. 543 (1968).
78. Id. at 550.
79. See United States v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813, 840 (9th Cir. 2004).
80. 483 U.S. 868 (1987).
81. Id. at 870-72.
82. See id. at 873.
83. Id. at 873-74.
84. 534 U.S. 112 (2001).
85. Id. at 117.
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ruled that the government can conduct a search of a proba-
tioner's home based on reasonable suspicion.8 6 In deciding this
case, the unanimous Court measured Knights's privacy inter-
est, which had been lowered by virtue of his post-convicted
status, with the government's interest, which was raised by a
general concern that past offenders tend to be future offend-
ers.
8 7
The privacy expectations of post-convicted persons became
even more limited when Congress passed the DNA Act of
2000.88 The purpose of the DNA Act was to provide funding to
states to expedite the admission of DNA evidence into the
Combined DNA Index System (CODIS), thereby facilitating
states' potential to solve crime.89 The DNA Act expanded
CODIS by including DNA evidence from crimes without sus-
pects, and mandating the collection of DNA from felons of
qualified crimes, whether they are currently incarcerated, on
release, or on probation.90 While challenged multiple times in
different circuits as an unreasonable, suspicionless search in
violation of a felon's Fourth Amendment rights,91 the courts
have upheld the DNA Act and similar state DNA acts each
time, although for different reasons.92 As of yet, the Supreme
Court has not considered this issue.
In 1999, the Second Circuit handed down a decision re-
garding a constitutional challenge to the Connecticut DNA
statute.93 Roe v. Marcotte involved Thomas Cobb, a convicted
sex offender, who objected to the law that required sex offend-
ers to surrender samples of their DNA for storage in a criminal
databank. 94 The Second Circuit denied Cobb's appeal, reason-
ing that the DNA statute was permissible under the "special
86. Id. at 118.
87. Id. at 118-22.
88. DNA Analysis Backlog Elimination Act of 2000, 42 U.S.C. § 14135
(2000).
89. Id. §§ 14134-14135.
90. Id. § 14135a.
91. See, e.g., United States v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813, 821 (9th Cir. 2004);
Green v. Berge, 354 F.3d 675, 676 (7th Cir. 2004); United States v. Kimler,
335 F.3d 1132, 1137-38 (10th Cir. 2003); Roe v. Marcotte, 193 F.3d 72, 74 (2d
Cir. 1999); Maryland v. Raines, 857 A.2d 19, 20 (Md. 2004).
92. Raines, 857 A.2d at 26-27 (stating that every court they could find has
upheld all DNA collection statutes before them, then listing multiple exam-
ples).
93. Marcotte, 193 F.3d 72.
94. Id. at 75-76.
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needs" doctrine.9 5 The court relied heavily on the Griffin opin-
ion, ultimately concluding that "[b]ecause studies cited by de-
fendants indicate a high rate of recidivism among sexual of-
fenders, and because DNA evidence is particularly useful in
solving such crimes, the statute passes the 'special needs' bal-
ancing test."9 6 The Seventh, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits, as well
as a sampling of district courts, have also upheld similar stat-
utes in this manner. 97
However, not every court has found the "special needs"
analysis persuasive. Other courts have relied on the traditional
standards balancing test to justify DNA acts. For example, the
plurality in United States v. Kincade98 held that the govern-
ment's interest in maintaining a DNA database outweighs the
intrusion compulsory DNA profiling represents to convicted of-
fenders. 99 The plurality reasoned that warrantless searches of
post-convicted persons are constitutional because these per-
sons, by virtue of being legally convicted, no longer share the
full panoply of rights as free citizens and because the state now
has a "far more substantial interest in invading their privacy
than it does in interfering with the liberty of law-abiding citi-
zens." 10 0 Because of differing privacy expectations between free
citizens and post-convicted persons, the Ninth Circuit's use of
the reasonableness balancing test to uphold the DNA Act is
particularly relevant to the issue of DNA dragnets.
95. Id. at 79.
96. Id. at 82.
97. See United States v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813, 830-31 (9th Cir. 2004)
(referencing Green v. Berge, 354 F.3d 675, 679 (7th Cir. 2004); United States
v. Kimler, 335 F.3d 1132, 1146 (10th Cir. 2003); Vore v. U.S. Dep't of Justice,
281 F. Supp. 2d 1129, 1133-35 (D. Ariz. 2003); Miller v. U.S. Parole Comm'n,
259 F. Supp. 2d 1166, 1175-78 (D. Kan. 2003)).
98. Id. at 813-40. Kincade has an interesting procedural posture. In Octo-
ber 2003, a three-judge panel ruled in favor of Kincade and held the DNA Act
unconstitutional. See United States v. Kincade, 345 F.3d 1095, 1113 (9th Cir.
2003). The entire Ninth Circuit, however, vacated that judgment and voted to
rehear the case en banc. See United States v. Kincade, 354 F.3d 1000 (9th Cir.
2004). This Note discusses the resulting en banc decision at length.
99. Kincade, 379 F.3d at 832.
100. Id. at 834.
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IV. DNA DRAGNETS VIOLATE THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT'S PROTECTIONS AGAINST
UNREASONABLE SEARCH AND SEIZURE
DNA acts push the boundaries of constitutionality and
survive primarily because of the status of the individual as a
post-convicted person. When individuals subjected to testing do
not have diminished privacy expectations, as in the context of
DNA dragnets, the government interest in compelling DNA col-
lection fails to outweigh the intrusion upon the individual un-
der the reasonableness balancing test. Without a non-law en-
forcement purpose in collecting DNA in mass sweeps, the
"special needs" exception does not apply. Nor can a DNA sam-
ple be compelled as part of an investigatory stop, because the
seizure of DNA falls outside the scope of the Terry stop-and-
frisk exception. The only way to obtain a DNA sample from a
nonsuspect, free citizen is through consent, but the very pur-
pose behind the DNA dragnet may make voluntary consent
practically impossible. Therefore, DNA searches of free citizens
without individualized suspicion are unconstitutional.
A. THE NEEDS OF THE GOVERNMENT Do NOT OUTWEIGH THE
IMPACT UPON THE INDIVIDUAL UNDER THE REASONABLENESS
BALANCING TEST
The plurality in Kincade and the majority in Maryland v.
Raines concluded that the state's compelling interest in collect-
ing DNA from a convicted person outweighs that person's rea-
sonable expectation of privacy, given the level of intrusion an
oral swab or a blood sampling represents.101 However, both
courts narrowly upheld the respective DNA acts under consid-
eration,10 2 incurring strong dissent, which argued that DNA
acts invade upon the legitimate privacy interests of post-
convicted persons. 10 3 Analyzing both courts' use of the reason-
ableness balancing test demonstrates the unconstitutionality of
DNA dragnets, because the balance of interests should shift in
favor of the individual when the privacy of free citizens is in
question.
101. Id. at 839; Maryland v. Raines, 857 A.2d 19, 43 (Md. 2004).
102. Kincade, 379 F.3d at 840; Raines, 857 A.2d at 43.
103. See infra notes 106-10.
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1. The Reduced Expectation of Privacy of Post-Convicted
Persons Does Not Apply to DNA Dragnets
The plurality opinion in Kincade first considered the level
of privacy to which post-convicted persons are entitled. 104 Ac-
cording to the plurality, it is a "well-established principle that
parolees and other conditional releasees are not entitled to the
full panoply of rights and protections possessed by the general
public."'105 Conditional releasees may therefore only claim those
rights that have not been restricted by the parole board. 106 In
addition, by virtue of their custodianship, presently incarcer-
ated persons, such as Raines, retain even less privacy expecta-
tions than parolees.107
The dissent in both cases conceded the general principle
that prisoners have diminished privacy expectations. However,
they disagreed with their respective court's opinion regarding
the scope of the remaining rights. For example, in his dissent-
ing opinion in Kincade, Judge Stephen Reinhardt argued that a
post-convicted person's right to privacy is not eliminated by vir-
tue of being lawfully convicted, and that even parolees and pro-
bationers still maintain an expectation of privacy. 108 Chief
Judge Robert M. Bell's dissent in Raines noted that collecting
DNA for identification purposes bears no relation to the func-
tioning of an efficient prison. 10 9 The true purpose of collecting
DNA must be crime detection, and the diminished privacy
rights of incarcerated persons are not related to such a
104. Kincade, 379 F.3d at 833.
105. Id. The court supports this statement by referencing McKune v. Lile,
536 U.S. 24 (2002); Pennsylvania Board of Probation & Parole v. Scott, 524
U.S. 357 (1998); and others. Id.
106. Kincade, 379 F.3d, at 834. For example, parolees are typically re-
stricted in their right to consume liquor, associate with certain individuals,
vote, and bear arms. Id. at 833 n.28. Most parolees must maintain regular
contact with their parole officer and obtain permission before changing jobs,
living situations, or residences. Id.
107. Raines, 857 A.2d at 33 (acknowledging that "incarcerated persons
have a severely diminished expectation of privacy"). Judge Alan M. Wilner
agrees: "As a group, defined by their own judicially-determined conduct, [pres-
ently incarcerated convicts] have a much reduced expectation of privacy. They
are routinely fingerprinted and photographed upon arrest, and those finger-
prints and photographs are stored and used for much the same purpose as the
DNA samples will be used." Id. at 49 (Wilner, J., concurring).
108. Kincade, 379 F.3d at 868 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting) ("IT]he error the
plurality makes is treating a reduction of 'some freedoms' as if it were equiva-
lent to the elimination of all.").
109. Raines, 857 A.2d at 61 (Bell, C.J., dissenting).
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search. 110 Judge Irma S. Raker agreed with the chief judge re-
garding prisoners' rights of bodily integrity,"1 but concurred
with the result of the majority, because she accepted the State's
argument that collection of DNA is no different than collection
of fingerprints. 112 Therefore, a majority of the Maryland court
agreed that the diminished privacy rights of incarcerated per-
sons are not, in and of themselves, enough to justify a suspi-
cionless search involving a violation of bodily integrity.
DNA dragnets inherently rely on suspicionless searches.
Rarely do police have even reasonable suspicion, let alone
probable cause, in testing DNA in mass sweeps. 113 The subjects
are usually free citizens who, unlike Kincade or Raines, have
not lost any expectation of privacy and maintain their full
panoply of rights. 14 Since the difference in privacy between
free persons and post-convicted persons is a "compelling dis-
tinction,"115 it would seem to follow that probable cause or a
warrant would be necessary to compel a DNA sample from a
free citizen, barring an immensely significant governmental in-
terest."16
110. Id. at 61-62 (Bell, C.J., dissenting).
111. Id. at 45 (Raker, J., concurring).
112. See id. But see id. at 63 (Bell, C.J., dissenting) (criticizing Judge Raker
for abandoning her principles and adopting a position where the ends justify
the means).
113. See supra notes 23-27 and accompanying text. But see Hansen, supra
note 17, at 43 (noting that the dragnet conducted in Lawrence, Massachusetts
was successful because police searched the narrow group of people who had
access to the victim in a nursing home).
114. See Rise v. Oregon, 59 F.3d 1556, 1560 (9th Cir. 1995). ("[Post-
convicted] persons do not have the same expectations of privacy in their identi-
fying genetic information that 'free persons' have.").
115. See id.
116. See id. (noting that while usually a warrant is needed to compel a
blood sample of a free person, that "absence of a warrant does not a fortiori
establish a violation of Fourth Amendment rights"). For example, a warrant is
not needed if there are exigent circumstances. See, e.g., United States v.
Chapel, 55 F.3d 1416, 1419 (9th Cir. 1995) (noting that police may compel a
blood sample from a person not yet arrested if they have probable cause and a
belief that evidence will be destroyed if a sample is not taken immediately,
such as in a drunk driving case). Because DNA is consistent throughout one's
lifetime, however, there are no exigent circumstances in the case of DNA iden-
tification. Jonathan F. Will, Comment, DNA as Property: Implications on the
Constitutionality of DNA Dragnets, 65 U. PITT. L. REV. 129, 138-39 (2003).
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2. DNA Profiling Is a More Significant Intrusion than a
Simple Oral Swab or Blood Test
Both Kincade and Raines considered the impact of the in-
trusion at the time the sample is extracted, 117 but failed to fully
take into account what is done with the sample once it has been
collected."l 8 While Kincade seemed to recognize the importance
of unlocking the DNA sequence, the plurality assumed that
DNA profiles contain only a record of the subject's identity,
much like a fingerprint. 119 In fact, it is possible that "DNA fin-
gerprints" contain more information than initially believed, in-
creasing the potential harm if DNA databases were ever
abused. 120 Based on the hypothesis that ever-increasing ad-
vances in technology will lead to ever-increasing intrusions of
the person, Judge Reinhardt constructs a classic parade of hor-
ribles argument. 121 "The power to assemble a permanent na-
tional DNA database ... has catastrophic potential. If placed in
the hands of an administration that chooses to 'exalt order at
the cost of liberty,' the database could be used to repress dis-
sent or, quite literally, to eliminate political opposition."'122
The potential threat to liberty concerns the profiles ex-
tracted from persons during the DNA dragnet who are not
charged with the crime. The DNA Act does not allow for states
to include DNA profiles of free citizens or even mere arrestees
117. United States v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813, 836 (9th Cir. 2004).
[I]t is firmly established that "the intrusion occasioned by a blood test
is not significant, since such tests are a commonplace in these days of
periodic physical examinations and experience with them teaches
that the quantity of blood extracted is minimal, and that for most
people the procedure involves virtually no risk, trauma, or pain."
Id. (quoting Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 625 (1989))
(internal quotation omitted); see also Maryland v. Raines, 857 A.2d 19, 31 (Md.
2004) (holding that a swab of the inner cheek is a minimal intrusion).
118. For an explanation of how forensic scientists use a DNA sample to
construct a genetic fingerprint, see generally DNA EVIDENCE, supra note 24,
at 65-69.
119. Kincade, 379 F.3d at 837.
120. Opponents of DNA fingerprinting reference scientific reports that
suggest these genetic profiles may contain personal data including the con-
tributor's race, sex, possible genetic defects, and genetic predisposition to dis-
eases. See Kincade, 379 F.3d at 849-50 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting).
121. Id. at 847-55 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting).
122. Id. at 847 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting) (quoting Whitney v. California,
274 U.S. 357, 374 (1927) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)). The plurality brushes
these concerns aside, however, suggesting the court will cross that bridge
when it comes to it. Id. at 837-38.
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into CODIS.123 However, the DNA Act does not prevent police
departments from keeping "suspect databases" containing the
profiles of those swept up during the dragnet. 124 Since police
departments routinely search these private databases, the in-
trusion upon the dragnetee is arguably repeated more times
than the initial intrusion upon bodily integrity. 125
Additionally, the practice of retaining a physical DNA
sample along with the DNA profile represents another possible
threat to liberty.126 While privacy risks associated with genetic
fingerprints are debatable, it is scientifically well established
that a physical DNA sample contains intimate personal infor-
mation. 127 If the FBI or individual police departments were to
release these genetic samples, 128 threats of genetic discrimina-
tion could arise. 129 While privacy legislation could reduce these
123. See 42 U.S.C. § 14132 (2000), amended by Justice For All Act of 2004,
Pub. L. No. 108-405, 118 Stat. 2260 (setting qualifications for information in
CODIS); DNA Analysis Backlog Elimination Act of 2000, 42 U.S.C. § 14135
(2000); cf. Kincade, 379 F.3d at 848 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting) ("CODIS also
contains profiles of individuals who have been convicted of no crime whatso-
ever but have merely had the misfortune of being arrested in Louisiana, Texas,
or Virginia.").
124. It is common practice among police departments to retain these sam-
ples for private department-wide databases. See supra notes 30-31 and ac-
companying text.
125. See Grand, supra note 17, at 2307-09 (arguing that while case law
permits the use of evidence in subsequent investigations, the continued use of
DNA evidence extracted from free persons during a dragnet may fall outside
the scope of consent).
126. Kincade, 379 F.3d at 850 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting) (noting that the
FBI encourages all DNA labs to retain a physical sample of all evidence they
collect for purposes of future retesting).
127. See COMM. ON DNA TECH. IN FORENSIC SCI., NAT'L RESEARCH
COUNCIL, DNA TECHNOLOGY IN FORENSIC SCIENCE 113 (1992); Yeshulas, su-
pra note 6, at 146-53. See generally Rebecca M. Bratspies, Biotechnology
Primer for Lawyers, in ALI-ABA COMM. ON PROF'L EDUC., ENVIRONMENTAL,
HEALTH, AND SAFETY REGULATION (2003) (explaining how DNA encodes ge-
netic information).
128. Such information retained by the government may not be as secure as
many people would desire. See Daniel J. Solove, Digital Dossiers and the Dis-
sipation of Fourth Amendment Privacy, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1083, 1105 (2002)
(arguing that information maintained by bureaucracies is "poorly regulated
and susceptible to abuse"); Will, supra note 116, at 132-33 (explaining the
highly personal and private nature of a person's DNA).
129. One possible scenario of genetic discrimination involves a job appli-
cant who is denied employment because he is genetically more likely to take
sick leave, resign, or retire early for health reasons. Council for Responsible
Genetics, Genetic Discrimination: Position Paper, at http://www.gene-watch.
org/educationallgenetic-discrimination.pdf (last visited May 4, 2005). Another
scenario involves an insurance company denying coverage to certain individu-
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threats, the absence of physical samples would go further to-
ward eliminating the possibility of abuse.
Taken together, the threats to liberty produced by genetic
testing represent a more serious level of intrusion than a mere
swab of the inner cheek. Even if the government passed legisla-
tion requiring police departments to erase all "suspect data-
bases" and destroy all physical samples, unlocking the DNA se-
quence remains an intrusion of its own.130 Courts addressing
DNA dragnets, as well as the DNA Act, should take this
heightened level of intrusion into account when they balance
the government's need against the intrusion upon the individ-
ual.
3. The Government's Interest in Crime Control, While
Significant, Does Not Outweigh the Level of Intrusion upon
the Individual
a. Raines Demonstrates that Even the Privacy Expectations of
Incarcerated Persons Challenge the Government Interest in
Crime Control
The court in Raines did not interpret the purpose of the
Maryland DNA Act to be one of general crime control. Instead,
the majority focused on Maryland's "profound" interest in iden-
tifying criminals with DNA, as it does with mug shots or fin-
gerprints. 13 1 Judge Alan M. Wilner and Chief Judge Bell both
disagreed with the majority on this interpretation, recognizing
the true purpose of the Maryland DNA Act to be crime preven-
tion. 132 Both judges balanced the State's interest in crime pre-
als because their genetic predispositions to diseases are preexisting conditions
for insurance purposes. Id.; Human Genome Project Information, Genetics
Privacy and Legislation; Why Legislation Is Needed Now, at http://www.ornl.
gov/scitechresources/HumanGenome/elsi/legislat.shtml (last modified Oct.
19, 2004).
130. Maryland v. Raines, 857 A.2d 19, 48-49 (Md. 2004) (Wilner, J., con-
curring) (arguing that the court should take into account the massive amount
of information DNA contains when analyzing the impact of the intrusion upon
the individual). For an interesting argument that genetic information is in-
separable from the self and unlocking that information is an intrusion upon
the self, see June Mary Z. Makdisi, Genetic Privacy: New Intrusion a New
Tort?, 34 CREIGHTON L. REV. 965 (2001).
131. Raines, 857 A.2d at 29. Judge Raker concurs and writes separately
because she argues that "the statute is constitutional on the narrow grounds
that DNA sampling is an acceptable means of identifying prisoners, and on
this basis alone, is reasonable." Id. at 44 (Raker, J., concurring).
132. Id. at 49 (Wilner, J., concurring) (citing statistics that presently incar-
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vention against the intrusion of DNA collection on the individ-
ual, the same analysis used by the plurality in Kincade. Judge
Wilner weighed these interests in favor of Maryland, 3 3 but
Chief Judge Bell came to the opposite conclusion, ruling
against Maryland, because Maryland failed to articulate any
argument to defeat the need for individualized suspicion.134
In the final tally, three members of the Maryland Court of
Appeals believed the State's interest to be identifying crimi-
nals, and four believed the State's interest to be crime preven-
tion.135 Four judges found that the State's interest, whatever it
might be, outweighed the incarcerated person's expectation of
privacy, and three judges believed that it did not. 136 Interest-
ingly enough, three of the four judges who believed the State's
interest to be crime prevention ruled against Maryland, favor-
ing a presently incarcerated, convicted person's expectation of
privacy over the State's interest in crime control.1 37
Because the government interest in conducting DNA drag-
nets is undoubtedly crime resolution as opposed to citizen iden-
tification, these four judges' opinions are the most relevant to
the present inquiry, suggesting that the Maryland Court of Ap-
peals may rule against the State in a DNA dragnet case.
b. DNA Dragnets Are an Inefficient Means of Fulfilling the
State's Legitimate Interest in Crime Control
The plurality in Kincade considered the government's in-
terests in the federal DNA Act to be "undeniably compelling"
for three reasons. 138 First, the Act created a means of identifi-
cation to link current releasees to criminal acts they may com-
mit while at large. Second, the Act provided a theoretical deter-
cerated persons have a high rate of recidivism and commenting on the State's
interest in keeping tabs on their future criminal activity); Id. at 62 (Bell, C.J.,
dissenting).
133. Id. at 52 (Wilner, J., concurring).
134. Id. at 63 (Bell, C.J., dissenting).
135. Judge Dale R. Cathell, Judge Lynne A. Battaglia, and Judge Raker
believe that the State's interest was to identify criminals, while Chief Judge
Bell, Judge Wilner, Judge Glenn T. Harrell, and Judge Clayton Greene believe
that the State's interest was crime prevention. Id. at 19.
136. Judge Cathell, Judge Battaglia, Judge Raker, and Judge Wilner rule
in favor of the State, while Judge Harrell and Judge Greene join in Chief
Judge Bell's dissent. Id.
137. Only Judge Wilner held that the State's interest is compelling over the
privacy interest of the convict. Id. at 48-49 (Wilner, J., concurring).
138. United States v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813, 838 (9th Cir. 2004).
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rent for future crime because the releasees know their DNA is
on file. Finally, the profiles may serve to facilitate the solving of
past crimes. 139 Despite their exuberant tone, however, the plu-
rality described interests that boil down to monitoring criminal
activity, deterrence, and crime prevention-interests the state
already effectively advances without the need for compulsive
DNA profiling.140
While the government's interest in crime prevention is un-
deniably significant, DNA dragnets are an inefficient means of
fulfilling that interest. The profiles created during DNA drag-
nets are not fed into CODIS and thus do not provide a signifi-
cant link from DNA to the identity of the individual.141 "Sus-
pect databases" maintained by individual police departments
may aid in the resolution of future crimes, but these local data-
bases are less helpful than national databases because they are
geographically limited. The dragnets themselves theoretically
aid in solving crime by eliminating potential suspects, but
these sweeps are "extremely unproductive" with police success-
fully identifying only one perpetrator in eighteen dragnets.1 42
Further, Kincade noted that an individual's knowledge
that their DNA is on file provides a theoretical deterrent for
parolees and releasees. However, while the same deterrent
would exist for free persons, most dragnetees are not told their
sample will be kept and used against them in future investiga-
tions.1 43 Without this knowledge, there is no deterrent.
Finally, DNA profiles of a free person might potentially aid
in resolving past crimes, but the extent of that potential is un-
known. While studies show post-convicted persons are prone to
recidivism, 144 this reasoning does not apply to free persons, who
have committed no crimes. 145
139. Id. at 838-39. The plurality considers the weight of these three inter-
ests together to be "monumental." Id. at 839.
140. Id. at 868-69 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting). Judge Reinhardt also criti-
cizes the plurality for using superfluous language when describing the state's
interest. Id.
141. See supra notes 30-31 and accompanying text.
142. See DNA Dragnets, supra note 22, at 6A (referencing a national study
released by the University of Nebraska at Omaha in September 2004).
143. See Grand, supra note 17, at 2306-09.
144. Kincade, 379 F.3d at 839.
145. Nevertheless, it cannot be assumed that someone has never commit-
ted a crime, just because they have never been convicted of a crime. Thus,
unless one assumes free persons are less likely to have committed a crime in
the past, then suspect databases may be as helpful in solving past crimes
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In conclusion, the government's interest in using DNA
dragnets is outweighed by the privacy expectations of free per-
sons. DNA dragnets may aid in solving specific crimes by
eliminating potential suspects, or help solve past and future
crimes by the use of "suspect databases" to store genetic finger-
prints. However, this interest remains one of general crime
control. The important Fourth Amendment question is whether
the state's general crime-control interest outweighs the intru-
sion DNA dragnets represent to the privacy interests of the
citizenry. If collecting DNA from post-convicted persons pushes
the boundaries of constitutionality, as demonstrated by the
contentious decisions in Kincade and Raines, then once free
persons are singled out, the balance of interests should shift in
favor of the free citizen. If states desire to continue using DNA
dragnets, those searches cannot be justified by traditional
Fourth Amendment balancing, and must find a home within a
Fourth Amendment exception.
B. THE GOVERNMENT DOES NOT HAVE A "SPECIAL NEED" IN
EITHER CONDUCTING DNA DRAGNETS OR MAINTAINING DNA
DATABASES OF FREE CITIZENS
The "special needs" doctrine has been used to justify war-
rantless, suspicionless searches in various contexts, including
compelled DNA collection from post-convicted persons. 146 How-
ever, the primary law enforcement purpose of DNA dragnets
controverts the justification for the "special needs" exception.
In his concurring opinion in Kincade, Judge Ronald M.
Gould upheld the DNA Act because its potential deterrent ef-
fect on those prone to recidivism represented a legitimate gov-
ernmental "special need." 147 The Second 148 and Seventh Cir-
cuits have also upheld DNA acts by similar reasoning. For
instance, in Green v. Berge, the Seventh Circuit upheld a Wis-
consin DNA act because the program served as an effective
means of identifying persons already seized by the State, much
the same as fingerprints or mug shots.149 However, these deci-
within their geographical limitations.
146. See Green v. Berge, 354 F.3d 675, 679 (7th Cir. 2004); United States v.
Kimler, 335 F.3d 1132, 1146 (10th Cir. 2003); Roe v. Marcotte, 193 F.3d 72,
78-82 (2d Cir. 1999); supra notes 80-83 and accompanying text.
147. See Kincade, 379 F.3d at 840-42 (Gould, J., concurring).
148. See supra notes 93-96 and accompanying text (discussing Roe v. Mar-
cotte, 193 F.3d 72 (2d Cir. 1999)).
149. Green, 354 F.3d at 679.
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sions specifically limit their reasoning to databases of post-
convicted persons, meaning these holdings are not directly ap-
plicable to programs that involve free persons.150
Nevertheless, it may be possible to construct a "special
needs" exception for the dragnets themselves or the "suspect
databases" they create. In determining the legitimacy of a "spe-
cial need," the Supreme Court has considered "the governmen-
tal interest involved, the nature of the intrusion, the privacy
expectations of the object of the search and, to some extent, the
manner in which the search is carried out."'15 1 However, the
Court has been "particularly reluctant to recognize exceptions
to the general rule of individualized suspicion where govern-
mental authorities primarily pursue their general crime control
ends."152
In City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, the Court explicitly re-
fused to extend the "special needs" exception to an automobile
checkpoint program "justified only by the generalized and ever-
present possibility that interrogation and inspection may reveal
that any given motorist has committed some crime."'5 3 While
the Edmond Court recognized the possibility of exigent circum-
stances justifying a checkpoint program, the Court distin-
guished between such emergency scenarios 5 4 and programs
that "simply stop cars as a matter of course to see if there just
happens to be a felon leaving the jurisdiction."155 DNA drag-
nets, which search for a suspect by collecting DNA from per-
sons vaguely connected to a victim, more closely resemble the
150. Kincade, 379 F.3d at 841 (Gould, J., concurring) (stating that the spe-
cial need to maintain DNA from post-convicted persons is gone once that per-
son has fully paid his or her debt to society and consequently their DNA pro-
file should be erased); Green, 354 F.3d at 680 (Easterbrook, J., concurring)
(stating that DNA collection from free persons would require "person-specific-
cause" or at least a separate "special needs" analysis and stating that "[w]hat
is 'reasonable' under the fourth amendment for a person on conditional re-
lease, or a felon, may be unreasonable for the general population"); Marcotte,
193 F.3d at 79-80 (referencing the statute's provision for expungement of the
profiles upon reversal or dismissal of a conviction as a necessary "safeguard"
to temper the database's intrusion into individual privacy).
151. Green, 354 F.3d at 678 (quoting Shelton v. Gudmanson, 934 F. Supp.
1048 (W.D. Wis. 1996)).
152. City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 43 (2000).
153. Id. at 44.
154. For example, an emergency scenario may justify "an appropriately tai-
lored roadblock set up to thwart an imminent terrorist attack or to catch a




latter scenario rejected by the Court. 15 6 Since the "special
needs" doctrine only encompasses needs beyond ordinary law
enforcement, and DNA dragnets are "indistinguishable from
the general interest in crime control," the dragnets cannot find
a bastion within the exception. 157
As for the "suspect databases" the dragnets produce, the
government could argue that it has a significant interest in
creating a DNA database that falls into the "special needs" ex-
ception. In United States v. Kimler,158 the Tenth Circuit upheld
the DNA Act under the "special needs" exception because "the
desire to build a DNA database goes beyond the ordinary law
enforcement need." 159 While this reasoning could also apply to
DNA databases of free persons, the context of Kimler indicated
that the Tenth Circuit was only referring to the existence of da-
tabases created by the DNA Act. 160 Further, in Green v.
Berge,161 the Seventh Circuit, discussing Kimler, balanced the
government's interest in maintaining a DNA database with the
"limited privacy interests that prisoners retain."1 62
With respect to "suspect databases," any court examining a
special need beyond normal law enforcement purposes must
balance the government's interest with the full expectation of
privacy that free persons enjoy. While a complete DNA data-
base of all citizens would certainly aid in solving crime, such a
mass intrusion upon the populace would run contrary to the in-
tent of the Founders. 63 Because police have little reason to
suspect persons in "suspect databases" of ever having commit-
ted a crime, the balance of interest should once again weigh in
favor of the individual. 64 Therefore, police departments will
need to justify these practices by other means. One possibility
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. 335 F.3d 1132 (10th Cir. 2003).
159. Id. at 1146.
160. The preceding sentence in the opinion refers specifically to the DNA
Act and its implication of the Fourth Amendment. Id.
161. 354 F.3d 675 (7th Cir. 2004).
162. Id. at 677.
163. See United States v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813, 842-50 (9th Cir. 2004)
(Reinhardt, J., dissenting) (discussing the purpose of the Fourth Amendment
and the expansion of CODIS); supra notes 36-40 and accompanying text.
164. "Suspect databases" contain the DNA profiles of DNA dragnet "volun-
teers." See Roberts, supra note 22, at 14A. Since these "volunteers" were never
suspects, and they "volunteered" a sample simply to eliminate themselves as




is to include DNA extraction as part of an investigatory stop,
while another is to ask people to waive their Fourth Amend-
ment rights and consent to the searches.
C. CONDUCTING WARRANTLESS, SUSPICIONLESS SEARCHES
FOR DNA FALLS OUTSIDE THE SCOPE OF INVESTIGATORY
TERRY STOPS
1. Involuntary Detentions, However Brief, for the Purpose of
Obtaining a DNA Sample Are Unconstitutional
Davis v. Mississippi and Hayes v. Florida both held that
warrantless detentions for the purpose of obtaining fingerprints
violate the Fourth Amendment. 165 The story of at least one
dragnetee, Floyd Wagster, eerily resembles that of John Davis.
In August 2002, Baton Rouge police contacted Wagster, telling
him that he was wanted for questioning. 166 After attempting
unsuccessfully to contact his lawyer, Wagster left the house to
run some errands. 167 Less than a half mile from his house he
was stopped by a local deputy, ordered to exit his van, hand-
cuffed, taken to the police station, interrogated, and asked to
provide a DNA sample. 168 In 1965, John Davis experienced
similar trouble from police. After a rape, in which the victim
could only identify the assailant as African American, police
questioned forty or fifty African American youths. Davis, who
occasionally worked for the victim, was brought into the sta-
tion, questioned, and fingerprinted without probable cause. 69
The Court found in favor of Davis, holding warrantless sei-
zures for the purpose of collecting fingerprints unconstitu-
tional.1 70 After recognizing the reliability of fingerprinting and
the limited intrusion that fingerprinting represents, the Court
nevertheless held that because there is no danger of destruc-
tion of fingerprints, no exception applied to justify the absence
165. See supra notes 58-65 and accompanying text.
166. See Hansen, supra note 17, at 38.
167. See id.
168. See id.
169. See Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721, 722 (1969). Joe Hayes received
treatment similar to Davis. See Hayes v. Florida, 470 U.S. 811, 814 (1985)
("Here, as in Davis, there was no probable cause to arrest, no consent to the
journey to the police station, and no judicial authorization for such a detention
for fingerprinting purposes.").
170. See supra notes 58-63 and accompanying text.
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of a warrant. 171 DNA samples, which are more intrusive than
fingerprints, share the same permanence as fingerprints. 172
Thus, involuntary detentions for the purpose of collecting DNA
should be unconstitutional according to Davis, meaning Wag-
ster's Fourth Amendment rights were violated. 173 Had Wagster
been charged with the Louisiana slayings, the admission of
DNA evidence would certainly have been objectionable.
2. Without Reasonable Suspicion, Police Have No Authority
To Compel DNA Samples in the Field
The dictum in Hayes, regarding the permissibility of in-
field fingerprinting, does not apply to Wagster, because Wag-
ster was involuntarily detained. However, it is likely that most
dragnetees succumb to DNA tests in the field.174 The majority
in Hayes suggested a three-part test for determining the consti-
tutionality of seizures in the field to obtain fingerprints: (1) if
there was reasonable suspicion that the suspect committed a
criminal act, (2) if there is a reasonable basis for believing that
fingerprints will establish or negate the suspect's connection
with that crime, and (3) if the procedure is carried out with dis-
patch.175
In the context of DNA dragnets, the second factor is easily
met. If police recover DNA from a crime scene, collecting DNA
from any person will help establish or negate that person's
connection to the crime. The third factor is also easily fulfilled,
because collecting DNA involves only a swab of the inner cheek,
which can be accomplished in seconds. However, the standard
DNA dragnet procedure cannot satisfy the first requirement-
reasonable suspicion.
"Articulating precisely what 'reasonable suspicion'...
mean[s] is not possible. [It is a] commonsense, nontechnical
conception[ ] that deal[s] with the factual and practical consid-
erations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent
men... act."' 76 Nevertheless, when detaining someone based
171. Davis, 394 U.S. at 727-28.
172. See supra Part IV.A.2.
173. Cf. Grand, supra note 17, at 2294-98.
174. Cf. Will, supra note 116, at 138, 143 (suggesting that the dicta in
Davis might be sufficient to sustain warrantless stops for the purpose of col-
lecting DNA).
175. See Hayes v. Florida, 470 U.S. 811, 816-17 (1985).
176. See Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 695 (1996) (internal quo-
tations and citations omitted).
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upon reasonable suspicion, the "detaining officers must have a
particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular
person stopped of criminal activity."177 For example, in Knights,
when Napa County police deputies entered Knights's apart-
ment with "reasonable suspicion," they had eyewitness ac-
counts of Knights disposing of objects believed to be pipe
bombs.178 Further, in Adams v. Williams, a Terry stop case
upon which Hayes draws support for its dicta, Police Sergeant
John Connolly's "reasonable suspicion" arose when a known in-
formant told Connolly that Williams was carrying a weapon. 179
Unlike Knights and Williams, the typical dragnetee has
not engaged in any suspicious activity. By definition, DNA
dragnets involve persons who are not suspects, and who have
only a vague connection to the victim or the crime scene.180 Be-
ing the neighbor, fellow student, or co-worker of a victim is not
a particularized fact relevant enough to cause a prudent person
to reasonably suspect an individual of committing a crime. Po-
lice may still talk to individuals on the street without detaining
them, but simply asking for a DNA sample might represent suf-
ficient authority to constitute a seizure of the person.' 8 ' Conse-
quently, without reasonable suspicion, police have no authority
to detain a person in the field for the purpose of collecting their
DNA.182 If investigatory stops for the purpose of collecting DNA
violate the subject's Fourth Amendment rights according to
Terry, Davis, and Hayes, then the only avenue remaining for
the constitutionality of DNA dragnets is for police to obtain
consent from all dragnetees.
177. United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417-18 (1981) (emphasis
added).
178. See United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 114-15 (2001).
179. See Hayes, 470 U.S. at 816; Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 144-45
(1972). Indeed, for a Terry stop to be reasonable the officer must observe the
individual's suspicious behavior at close range. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 24-
25 (1968). This criterion suggests that the officer must have some particular-
ized reason to suspect the individual of not only carrying a weapon, but also be
involved in some sort of criminal activity. See id.
180. See supra notes 23-27 and accompanying text.
181. Cf. Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 222 (1979) (Rehnquist, C.J.,
dissenting) (arguing that nothing in the Constitution forbids police officers
from asking people if they are willing to talk). The circuit courts have identi-
fied several factors for determining when a investigatory seizure has taken
place; many involve the individual's belief that he has no right to leave the
conversation. For an argument that DNA dragnets may constitute a seizure in
violation of the Fourth Amendment on these grounds, see Grand, supra note
17, at 2293-98.
182. See LAFAVE, supra note 57, at 545-46.
186920051
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
D. IT MAY BE IMPOSSIBLE To VOLUNTARILY CONSENT TO THESE
DNA SEARCHES
The constitutionality of DNA dragnets becomes a nonissue
if all dragnetees waive their Fourth Amendment protections.
DNA dragnets are usually conducted on a consent basis for this
reason.183 However, consent is not legitimate unless it is volun-
tary, and the very purpose of DNA dragnets-to stir up a sus-
pect-may preclude the possibility of voluntary consent.
In some cases, elements of coercion predominate the en-
counter between police officers and dragnetees. 184 For example,
when Floyd Wagster was taken into police custody, Major Bud
Connor, the chief of detectives, told him, "You gonna give DNA.
We're gonna go get a court order to get it from you."'185 Accord-
ing to Wagster, Connor threatened him with jail time and
threatened to tell the media that Wagster was not cooperating,
making him a suspect in a high-profile murder investigation.18 6
Based upon Wagster's own statements, an objective police
officer could not reasonably believe the consent to be volun-
tary.187 Connor's threats of jail time, informing the media, and
obtaining a court order each constituted coercion. However,
Wagster's case was probably an outlier, as the typical drag-
netee is probably not threatened to this extent. Nevertheless,
the nature of the dragnet implies strong elements of coercion,
including the threat to apply for or obtain a court order, the
psychological impact of being a suspect, the lack of knowledge
regarding one's right to refuse consent, and the lack of knowl-
edge regarding the scope of one's consent.
Threatening to obtain a search warrant when there is not
probable cause to obtain one carries a similar level of coercion
as the Bumper situation, where police officers falsely repre-
sented they had a search warrant. 188 "[I]t may generally be said
183. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
184. See, e.g., Grand, supra note 17, at 2305 (discussing Blair Shelton's al-
leged harassment); Hansen, supra note 17, at 38-41 (discussing Floyd Wag-
ster's allegations of coercion).
185. Hansen, supra note 17, at 40.
186. Id.
187. See DNA Suit Issues, supra note 11, at 6A; Hansen, supra note 17, at
40; Roberts, supra note 22, at 14A.
188. United States v. Faruolo, 506 F.2d 490, 496 (2d Cir. 1974) (Newman,
J., concurring) ("If he consents because he has been led to believe that obtain-
ing a warrant is a virtually automatic formality, then regardless of his appar-
ent willingness to permit the search, he has responded to a situation as 'in-
stinct with coercion' as the one in Bumper."); LAFAVE, supra note 57, at 187
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that a threat to obtain a search warrant is likely to be held to
invalidate a subsequent consent if there were not then grounds
upon which a warrant could issue .... "1 8 9 Refusal alone cannot
constitute such grounds because the Court has "consistently
held that a refusal to cooperate, without more, does not furnish
the minimal level of objective justification needed for a deten-
tion or seizure."190 Since there could be many reasons why a
dragnetee would not want to yield a sample that does not relate
to the particular case the police are investigating, 191 police
should need more than mere refusal to obtain a court order.
Consequently, threats to obtain such an order misrepresent po-
lice authority and are strongly coercive. 192
The difference between threatening to obtain a court order
and threatening to apply for a court order permits police to rep-
resent to dragnetees that they will become suspects if they do
not consent to the search. 193 However, because of psychological
("The only noticeable difference between a false claim that a warrant has been
obtained and a false claim that a warrant will be obtained is that the latter is
less immediate; it threatens a search soon but not instantly.").
189. LAFAVE, supra note 57, at 188.
190. Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 437 (1991). Further, refusal alone
cannot constitute reasonable suspicion because reasonable suspicion based
solely on refusal to consent to a search produces a situation where police get a
sample regardless of whether an individual consents or not. This catch-22
situation seems to invalidate the need for consent-based searches and disre-
gard the Fourth Amendment entirely. Cf. Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721,
726 (1969) ("[To argue that the Fourth Amendment does not apply to the in-
vestigatory stage is fundamentally to misconceive the purpose of the Fourth
Amendment... to prevent wholesale intrusions upon the personal security of
our citizenry.").
191. William Moffitt, past president of the National Association of Criminal
Defense Lawyers argued:
You could have 100 reasons why you don't want to give your DNA
that doesn't relate to this particular case.... You don't know what's
going to happen to it, you don't know where it's going to be kept, you
don't know whether they're holding a database. Another good reason
is "I may have committed another crime that I don't want you to know
about."
60 Minutes, supra note 14.
192. Police cannot misrepresent their authority for the purpose of obtain-
ing consent. See Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 548-49 (1968); Hol-
loway v. Wolff, 482 F.2d 110, 114 (8th Cir. 1973); United States v. Cruz, 701 F.
Supp. 440, 447-48 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (favoring a public policy that excludes evi-
dence obtained by misrepresentation of facts); see also Grand, supra note 17,
at 2305 (arguing that DNA dragnets represent the same type of coercion pre-
sent in Bumper and suggesting that a court would not uphold such a search on
these grounds).
193. See LAFAVE, supra note 57, at 185-86 (arguing that only the most so-
phisticated of persons can distinguish between threat to obtain an order now
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factors inherent in DNA dragnets, these scenarios are distin-
guishable from the day-to-day situations where police advise
citizens that a warrant can be issued. Dragnetees must choose
between maintaining their genetic privacy for the limited time
before a warrant can be issued and being a suspect in a high-
profile rape or murder investigation. 194
Psychological studies suggest that an ethos of obedience is
socially ingrained in most people to such a large extent that be-
ing faced with legitimate authority impairs one's ability to
make decisions affecting their constitutional rights. 195 When
this innate tendency toward obedience is coupled with the
threat of both the police and the news media prying into all as-
pects of a dragnetee's personal life, refusing consent might not
seem like a choice at all. 196 Since psychological factors, such as
coercive situations or locations, can play a role in the volun-
tariness of consent, 197 being asked to eliminate oneself as a po-
tential suspect should constitute an element of coercion. 198
Further, dragnetees may not realize the total scope of their
consent, because they are not fully informed about what may
happen to their DNA.199 They may falsely assume that it will
be destroyed when they are ruled out as a suspect, and may not
realize that their DNA is likely to be kept on file with the local
police for an extended period of time.200 If knowledge of one's
right to refuse consent is a relevant factor in determining vol-
untariness, 20 1 then knowledge of the scope of one's consent also
and the threat that an order may be obtained).
194. Compare this to Hayes v. Florida, 470 U.S. 811, 812 (1985), where the
Court frowned on police approaching Hayes at his home, asking him to submit
to fingerprinting, and threatening to arrest him if he did not comply.
195. Marcy Strauss, Criminal Law: Reconstructing Consent, 92 J. CRIM. L.
& CRIMINOLOGY 211, 236-44 (2001) (referencing numerous psychological stud-
ies to argue that most people would not feel free to deny an officer's request,
even if it was against their best interest to do so).
196. See, e.g., Willing, supra note 17, at 2A.
197. Cf. Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 439 (1991) (recognizing the sig-
nificance of the cramped confines of a bus on a consenting person's state of
mind).
198. The only benefit of consenting is being released as a suspect, but
courts in other contexts have found coercion when police obtain consent by of-
fering a carrot with one hand and holding a stick with the other. See, e.g., Lou-
isiana v. Alexis, 514 So. 2d 561, 564-65 (La. Ct. App. 1987).
199. See Grand, supra note 17, at 2306-10.
200. See id. (arguing that even if the initial consent is voluntary, keeping a
DNA sample on file falls outside the scope of consent).
201. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 227 (1973); People v.
Richards, 500 N.Y.S.2d 767, 768 (N.Y. App. Div. 1986); Pennsylvania v. Walsh,
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seems to be relevant. Thus, the dragnetees' lack of knowledge
regarding the scope of their consent should play a role in de-
termining voluntariness. Taken together with the fear of be-
coming a suspect and the threat to obtain a court order, simply
asking for a DNA sample might represent enough coercion to
negate the voluntariness of consent.
Proponents of DNA dragnets may argue that pointing out
individual instances of police misconduct or identifying indi-
vidual elements of coercion does not mean the practice is inher-
ently coercive. For instance, courts generally permit police offi-
cers to engage in the "knock and talk" procedure,202 a similar
police practice to dragnets, where officers confront individuals
at their homes, and ask permission to search their resi-
dences. 203 Even courts that find the situation to be inherently
coercive nevertheless allow the practice in the absence of fur-
ther police misconduct.20 4 The "knock and talk" procedure may
push the envelope of constitutionality and should be scrutinized
carefully, but it is not per se unconstitutional. 20 5
However, the analogy between DNA dragnets and "knock
and talk" encounters is not entirely apt, as "knock and talk" en-
counters are used to investigate suspicious activity while DNA
dragnets are used to create suspicion.20 6 If "knock and talk"
searches push the boundaries of constitutionality as they are, it
is doubtful that any court would uphold the use of such inher-
ently coercive tactics when police have absolutely no suspicion
of wrongdoing. Further, DNA dragnets are arguably more coer-
cive than "knock and talk" encounters because dragnetees often
460 A.2d 767, 771 (Pa. 1983).
202. See United States v. Hardeman, 36 F. Supp. 2d 770, 777-78 (E.D.
Mich. 1999) (defining the "knock and talk" as "a noncustodial procedure [in
which] the officer identifies himself and asks to talk to the home occupant and
then eventually requests permission to search the residence" (internal cita-
tions omitted)).
203. See Estate of Smith v. Marasco, 318 F.3d 497, 519 (3d Cir. 2003);
United States v. Jerez, 108 F.3d 684, 691-92 (7th Cir. 1997).
204. See, e.g., Washington v. Ferrier, 960 P.2d 927, 933-34 (Wash. 1998).
205. See Hayes v. Indiana, 794 N.E.2d 492, 497 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003).
206. See, e.g., United States v. Holt, 264 F.3d 1215, 1219 (10th Cir. 2001)
(documenting an instance where an assistant district attorney concluded that
there was not enough evidence to obtain a warrant, but suggested that police
utilize the "knock and talk" technique). The "knock and talk" procedure is
most commonly used in drug enforcement cases when police have complaints
about drugs being sold out of a house, but do not have enough evidence to ob-
tain a warrant. See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 170 F.3d 708, 711 (7th Cir.
1999); Craig Hemmens, I Hear You Knocking: The Supreme Court Revisits the
Knock and Announce Rule, 66 UMKC L. REV. 559, 595 n.382 (1998).
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do not have the ability to retreat into their home, and "knock
and talk" encounters do not usually involve the threat of be-
coming a suspect in a high-profile investigation. 207
Nevertheless, proponents might argue that DNA dragnets
could be constitutional if steps were taken to reduce the ele-
ments of coercion. However, the purpose of the dragnet pre-
cludes the application of mitigating procedures. To mitigate the
coercive effects of DNA dragnets, dragnetees must be informed
of their right to refuse consent and be released from the burden
of being a suspect if they exercise that right. Dragnetees must
also be made aware that their DNA sample could be used
against them in future criminal investigations if they comply
with the search. If significantly fewer people consent as a result
of learning this information, then the dragnet has failed to re-
duce the field of potential suspects. Instead, the search merely
yields a database of persons who have probably never commit-
ted a crime. 208 The limited usefulness of the search conducted
using mitigating procedures seems to negate the purposes in
conducting the dragnet in the first place-catching a specific
criminal and stirring up a potential suspect. Consequently, to
stir up a suspect and ensure the dragnet's effectiveness, police
must represent to persons that they will become suspects if
they do not consent. Once police make that representation, the
elements of coercion once again arise and voluntary consent be-
comes unlikely.
CONCLUSION
The fact that the government can approach an individual,
obtain a sample of his or her DNA without voluntary consent,
and use that sample to construct a genetic profile that could be
used against that person in a future criminal investigation is
disturbing to the very core of the Fourth Amendment. Courts
have allowed such searches on people like Thomas Kincade and
Charles Raines because of their status as post-convicted per-
sons. Because of this status, Kincade and Raines have a low-
ered expectation of privacy and the government has a raised in-
terest in their identity. However, as the cases of Kincade and
Raines demonstrate, compelled DNA collection from post-
207. Since the police utilize the "knock and talk" technique to investigate
suspicion, residents are more or less placed on notice of that suspicion, while
dragnetees are given a choice between being suspected of a crime or allowing
the search.
208. See supra note 27.
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convicted persons satisfies the Fourth Amendment only by the
narrowest of margins.
Despite this, states increasingly conduct DNA searches of
free persons in DNA dragnets. The full privacy expectations of
free citizens should shift the balance in favor of the individual,
making compelled extraction unconstitutional. Further, these
warrantless, suspicionless searches are instinct with coercion,
making voluntary consent unlikely, if not impossible. Neverthe-
less, individuals like Floyd Wagster, who have committed no
crime and who have no diminished privacy expectations, are
required to provide a DNA sample to the state. Passing legisla-
tion to regulate DNA dragnets is not the answer, because the
practice itself violates the Fourth Amendment. As Thomas Jef-
ferson once warned, "[t]he time to guard against corruption and
tyranny, is before they shall have gotten hold on us. It is better
to keep the wolf out of the fold, than to trust to drawing his
teeth and talons after he shall have entered."209
209. THOMAS JEFFERSON, NOTES ON THE STATE OF VIRGINIA 121 (William
Peden ed., 1982).
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